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An nterxationa Antits Challenge
James A. Rahl*
Most of the developed nations outside the Communist bloc profess
competition and antitrust as basic features of economic policy. But faith
in the value of competition, vigorous though it may be in protection of
the domestic economy, weakens or disappears entirely when nations face
outward in their exports and sales in foreign markets.
The contrast between domestic and international policy is extreme.
The United States, the European Economic Community ("EEC"), and
most other developed nations are committed to doctrines of extraterrito-
rial antitrust application to conduct abroad when restraints of competi-
tion are aimed by foreigners at their domestic supplies and prices. The
same foreigners who thus find another regime's antitrust law to be part of
the law they must sometimes obey may encounter restraints of competi-
tion aimed at their markets that operate under antitrust immunities
granted by the same jurisdiction that claims extraterritorial jurisdiction
over them.
The United States has three different, overlapping statutes that
largely neutralize the Sherman Act's broad "foreign commerce" clause
where exports are concerned. The EEC and most other nations find the
way out much simpler. Having no foreign commerce clause at all, their
laws simply do not reach outbound restraints. An exception always to be
found in all the laws, of course, is that the restraints become illegal if, by
"spill-over" or other means, they are not confined to restraining foreign-
ers abroad, but have adverse domestic consequences as well.
The foreign target of outbound restraints may seek protection under
its own jurisdiction's extraterritorial antitrust doctrine. Except in the
United States, where private suits may be possible, this requires persuad-




ing the target's governing authorities to act. Occasionally they do act,
but usually they do not. This is partly because if they attack a foreign
cartel, they may precipitate a retaliatory attack on their own cartels. The
result appears to be something of a "stand-off," with antitrust policy one
of the victims.
Worse, cartels beget other cartels. Thus, buying cartels may form
under legal protection to offset export selling cartels. Further, legal ex-
port cartels of given nations in a given industry may have incentive to
join their activities in an international cartel. The idea of course will
occur to them. While such international cartels may attract application
of extraterritorially applied antitrust laws that are otherwise dormant in-
ternationally, individual nations may be reluctant to act alone when sev-
eral nations are involved. Consultation and cooperation may occur
through the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
("OECD") or bilateral channels, but there is no mechanism for joint en-
forcement-no such thing as a suit entitled European Economic Commu-
nity, Japan, United States et al. v. Cartel X.
The situation appears to be especially dangerous for less-developed
countries who have no effective antitrust laws of their own. U.S. and
other antitrust laws, lacking application to outbound restraints, often
would not reach international cartels that are limited to sales to develop-
ing countries.
It is often claimed that international cartels are old-fashioned and
have waned in importance. While this may be true to some degree, the
real degree is unknown, and the idea itself flies in the face of a great deal
of experience and theory. With markets becoming increasingly interna-
tional and competitors of different nations increasingly meeting each
other around the world, it is reasonable to ask whether more, not less,
internationally organized restrictive activity is to be expected. The ques-
tion is a serious one when we take into account the growth of govern-
mental encouragement, sponsorship, and actual compulsion of
internationally applied restraints of competition, often connected with a
nation's foreign trade policies. We should face the fact that we are invit-
ing governments to arrange such restraints through our exculpatory doc-
trines of sovereign compulsion, sovereign immunity, act of state, and
comity, as well as through our own respective trade practices and
policies.
If competition does not have the virtues usually claimed for it, per-
haps there is no cause for alarm at the sight of this seemingly menacing
bundle of two-faced policies. Otherwise, should we not begin to try to
appraise the costs to the world? There are obvious intellectual and moral
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penalties in present courses of national and international conduct, de-
manding at least some serious rationalization, and better, some solutions.
And what are the economic costs? If it is true, as we keep saying, that
cartels and single-firm dominance reduce output, raise prices, and lead to
misallocation, are these effects somehow not present on the international
level?
International cooperation through OECD and other channels has
not proved to be enough in itself to deal with these problems. Is a truly
international law approach too much to seek? It was thought possible
after World War II in the drafting of the Havana Charter, but the effort
failed. In 1980, the United Nations General Assembly adopted what is
popularly called the "U.N. Restrictive Business Practices Code," urged
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on behalf
of the developing nations, and negotiated at great length by representa-
tives of the Western bloc, Communist bloc, and the developing nations.
The "Code" provides a set of rules and principles on restrictive practices
and abuse of dominant power that could go far in dealing with the
problems described above. But the first two things one usually hears
about the "Code" whenever it is mentioned are that it is non-binding,
and that there is no enforcement mechanism.
The "Code" obviously is roundly ignored by the principal powers.
The history of its negotiations does not inspire great confidence that an
international law solution is near at hand. What is to be done?
